## 1NC

# **1**

Your decision should answer the resolutional question: Is the enactment of topical action better than the status quo or a competitive option?

“Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School ‘04 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

“United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means

Ericson, 03 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

The usfg is in Washington

Encarta 2k (Encarta Online Encyclopedia http://encarta.msn.com ) KENTUCKY

“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC”

Vote neg:

1. Preparation and clash—changing the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and permute alternatives—strategic fairness is key to engaging a well-prepared opponent

2. Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims, which destroys the decision-making benefits of the activity

Steinberg and Freeley ‘13

David Director of Debate at U Miami, Former President of CEDA, officer, American Forensic Association and National Communication Association. Lecturer in Communication studies and rhetoric. Advisor to Miami Urban Debate League, Masters in Communication, and Austin, JD, Suffolk University, attorney who focuses on criminal, personal injury and civil rights law, *Argumentation and Debate*

*Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making*, Thirteen Edition

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state­ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec­tive of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci­sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam­ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise­ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi­ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis­course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta­tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro­vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden­tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca­demic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri­ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some­thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca­demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu­nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless­ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen­tation. If we take this statement to mean *Iliad* the written word is more effec­tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote weII-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web­site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo­cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

Decisionmaking is the most portable and flexible skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy

Steinberg and Freeley ‘13

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In the spring of 2011, facing a legacy of problematic U.S, military involvement in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and criticism for what some saw as slow sup­port of the United States for the people of Egypt and Tunisia as citizens of those nations ousted their formerly American-backed dictators, the administration of President Barack Obama considered its options in providing support for rebels seeking to overthrow the government of Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya. Public debate was robust as the administration sought to determine its most appropriate action. The president ultimately decided to engage in an international coalition, enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 through a number of measures including establishment of a no-fly zone through air and missile strikes to support rebels in Libya, but stopping short of direct U.S. intervention with ground forces or any occupation of Libya. While the action seemed to achieve its immediate objectives, most notably the defeat of Qaddafi and his regime, the American president received both criticism and praise for his mea­sured yet assertive decision. In fact, the past decade has challenged American leaders to make many difficult decisions in response to potentially catastrophic problems. Public debate has raged in chaotic environment of political division and apparent animosity, The process of public decision making may have never been so consequential or difficult. Beginning in the fall of 2008, Presidents Bush and Obama faced a growing eco­nomic crisis and responded in part with '’bailouts'' of certain Wall Street financial entities, additional bailouts of Detroit automakers, and a major economic stimu­lus package. All these actions generated substantial public discourse regarding the necessity, wisdom, and consequences of acting (or not acting). In the summer of 2011, the president and the Congress participated in heated debates (and attempted negotiations) to raise the nation's debt ceiling such that the U.S. Federal Govern­ment could pay its debts and continue government operations. This discussion was linked to a debate about the size of the exponentially growing national debt, gov­ernment spending, and taxation. Further, in the spring of 2012, U.S. leaders sought to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapon capability while gas prices in the United States rose, The United States considered its ongoing military involvement in Afghanistan in the face of nationwide protests and violence in that country1 sparked by the alleged burning of Korans by American soldiers, and Americans observed the actions of President Bashir Al-Assad and Syrian forces as they killed Syrian citizens in response to a rebel uprising in that nation and considered the role of the United States in that action. Meanwhile, public discourse, in part generated and intensified by the cam­paigns of the GOP candidates for president and consequent media coverage, addressed issues dividing Americans, including health care, women's rights to reproductive health services, the freedom of churches and church-run organiza­tions to remain true to their beliefs in providing (or electing not to provide) health care services which they oppose, the growing gap between the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans and the rest of the American population, and continued high levels of unemployment. More division among the American public would be hard to imagine. Yet through all the tension, conflict was almost entirely ver­bal in nature, aimed at discovering or advocating solutions to growing problems. Individuals also faced daunting decisions. A young couple, underwater with their mortgage and struggling to make their monthly payments, considered walking away from their loan; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job and a teenager decided between an iPhone and an iPad. Each of these situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions. Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consider­ation: others scorn to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and co­workers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make deci­sions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations. We all engage in discourse surrounding our necessary decisions every day. To refinance or sell one’s home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an eco­nomical hybrid car, what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candi­date to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration? Is the defendant guilty as accused? Should we watch The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue—all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, Time magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year.” Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of “great men” in the creation of his­tory, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs, online networking, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, and many other “wikis," and social networking sites, knowledge and truth are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. Through a quick keyword search, we have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs? Much of what suffices as information is not reliable, or even ethically motivated. The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical deci­sions' relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength, And, critical thinking offers tools enabling the user to better understand the' nature and relative quality of the message under consider­ation. Critical thinkers are better users of information as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. The executive order establishing California's requirement states; Instruction in critical thinking is designed to achieve an understanding of the relationship of language to logic, which would lead to the ability to analyze, criticize and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambigu­ous statements of knowledge or belief. The minimal competence to be expected at the successful conclusion of instruction in critical thinking should be the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, belief from knowledge, and skills in elementary inductive arid deductive processes, including an under­standing of die formal and informal fallacies of language and thought. Competency in critical thinking is a prerequisite to participating effectively in human affairs, pursuing higher education, and succeeding in the highly com­petitive world of business and the professions. Michael Scriven and Richard Paul for the National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking Instruction argued that the effective critical thinker: raises vital questions and problems, formulating them clearly and precisely; gathers and assesses relevant information, using abstract ideas to interpret it effectively; comes to well-reasoned conclusions and solutions, testing them against relevant criteria and standards; thinks open-mindedly within alternative systems of thought, recognizing, and assessing, as need be, their assumptions, implications, and practical con­sequences; and communicates effectively with others in figuring our solutions to complex problems. They also observed that critical thinking entails effective communication and problem solving abilities and a commitment to overcome our native egocentrism and sociocentrism,"1 Debate as a classroom exercise and as a mode of thinking and behaving uniquely promotes development of each of these skill sets. Since classical times, debate has been one of the best methods of learning and applying the principles of critical thinking. Contemporary research confirms the value of debate. One study concluded: The impact of public communication training on the critical thinking ability of the participants is demonstrably positive. This summary of existing research reaffirms what many ex-debaters and others in forensics, public speaking, mock trial, or argumentation would support: participation improves die thinking of those involved,2 In particular, debate education improves the ability to think critically. In a com­prehensive review of the relevant research, Kent Colbert concluded, "'The debate-critical thinking literature provides presumptive proof ■favoring a positive debate-critical thinking relationship.11'1 Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates, formal or informal, These take place in intrapersonal commu­nications, with which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, and in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to argu­ments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others. Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of’ others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job offer, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few Of the thousands of deci­sions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of respon­sibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for our product, or a vote for our favored political candidate. Some people make decision by flipping a coin. Others act on a whim or respond unconsciously to “hidden persuaders.” If the problem is trivial—such as whether to go to a concert or a film—the particular method used is unimportant. For more crucial matters, however, mature adults require a reasoned methods of decision making. Decisions should be justified by good reasons based on accurate evidence and valid reasoning.

3. Topical fairness requirements are key to effective dialogue—monopolizing strategy and prep makes the discussion one-sided and subverts any meaningful neg role

Galloway 7—Samford Comm prof (Ryan, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007)

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. **Far from** being **a banal request for links** to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon **months of preparation**, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms **operate to exclude** particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). **Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation** (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. **Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits** of topical advocacy.

4. Dialogic democracy is the best way to dismantle racism—our vision of debate is the opposite of exclusion

Gooding-Williams 3

 Race, Multiculturalism and Democracy Robert Gooding-Wiliams Robert Gooding-Williams (Ph.D., Yale, 1982) is the Ralph and Mary Otis Isham Professor of Political Science and the College. He is also a Faculty Associate of the Chicago Center for Contemporary Theory and an affiliate of the Center for the Study of Race, Politics and Culture. His areas of interest include Du Bois, Critical Race Theory, the History of African-American Political Thought, 19th Century German Philosophy (especially Nietzsche), Existentialism, and Aesthetics (including literature and philosophy, representations of race in film, and the literary theory and criticism of African-American literature). Before coming to the University of Chicago he taught at Northwestern University (1998-2005), where he was Professor of Philosophy, Director of the Alice Berline Kaplan Center for the Humanities (2003-2005), Adjunct Professor of African American Studies, and an affiliate of the Program in Critical Theory. Before coming to Northwestern he taught at Amherst College (1988-98), where he was Professor of Black Studies and the George Lyman Crosby 1896 Professor of Philosophy, and at Simmons College (1983-88), where he taught philosophy and directed the program in Afro-American Studies. Issue Constellations Volume 5, Issue 1, pages 18–41, March 1998

 I begin with the assumption that fostering the capacity for democratic deliber- ation is a central aim of public education in a democratic society.531 also follow a number of contemporary political theorists in supposing that democratic deliber- ation is a form of public reasoning geared towards adducing considerations that all parties to a given deliberation can find compelling.54 On this view, successful deliberation requires that co-deliberators cultivate a mutual understanding of the differences in conviction that divide them, so that they can formulate reasons (say for implementing or not implementing a proposed policy) that will be generally acceptable despite those differences.55 In the words of one theorist, "[deliberation encourages people with conflicting perspectives to understand each other's point of view, to minimize their moral disagreements, and to search for common ground."56 Lorenzo Simpson usefully glosses the pursuit of mutual understanding when he writes that it requires "a 'reversibility of perspectives,' not in the sense of my collapsing into yon or you into me, but in the sense that I try to understand - but not necessarily agree with - what you take your life to be about and you do the same for me . . . [i]n such a . . . mutual understanding you may come to alter the way in which you understand yourself and I . . . may find that listening to you leads me to alter my self-understanding."57 According to Simpson, the search for common ground need not leave us with the convictions with which we began. On the contrary, the process of democratic deliberation can be a source of self-trans- formation that enriches one's view of the issues at hand and even alters one's conception of the demands of social justice.58 In multicultural America, multicultural public education is a good that promotes mutual understanding across cultural differences, thereby fostering and strengthening citizens' capacities for democratic deliberation. In essence, multi- cultural education is a form of pedagogy whereby students study the histories and cultures of differently cultured fellow citizens, many of whose identities have a composite, multicultural character. More exactly, it is a form of cross-cultural hermeneutical dialogue, and therefore a way of entering into conversation with those histories and cultures.59 By disseminating the cultural capital of cross- cultural knowledge, multicultural education can cultivate citizens' abilities to "reverse perspectives." By facilitating mutual understanding, it can help them to shape shared vocabularies for understanding their moral and cultural identities and for finding common ground in their deliberations.60 By strengthening a student's ability to reverse perspectives, multicultural education may bolster her disposition to engage the self-understandings of differ- ently cultured others, even if the particulars of her multicultural education have not involved an engagement with the cultures of precisely those others (consider, e.g., someone whose multicultural education has included courses in Asian- American literatures, but who knows nothing of American Latino subcultures). Acquiring a know-how and a feel for cross-cultural hermeneutical conversation is likely to reinforce a student's inclination to understand and learn from the self- interpretations of cultural "others" in just the way that the cultivation of an athletic skill (e.g., the ability to "head" a soccer ball) tends to reinforce one's inclination to participate in the sports for which having that skill is an advantage (e.g. playing soccer). In the case of multicultural education, one cultivates a skill which is motivationally conducive to the sort of mutual understanding that is crit- ical to the flourishing of deliberative democracy in a multicultural society.61 Let me summarize my argument so far. In contrast to Schlesinger. who yearns for a society 111 which the understanding of key political ideals remains immune from deliberative debate animated by cultural and other group differences, I have been suggesting that deliberative debate of this sort is an appropriate medium for seeking and forging common grounds and ideals. I have also been arguing (1) that a commitment to deliberative democracy in multicultural America entails a commitment to promoting the mutual understanding of differences through cross-cultural dialogue and (2) that such a commitment justifies the institution of multicultural education. The promotion of mutual understanding avoids Schlesinger's and Asante's kitsch, because it is not predicated off an imperative to preserve an uncomplicated national or ethnic identity in the face of cultural and social complexity. Indeed, the ideal of mutual understanding invites increasing complexity by suggesting that cross-cultural educational insights, since they can effect changes in the self-understandings of persons who have benefitted from a multicultural education, may alter and further complicate those persons' identities, perhaps making them more multicultural. In what follows, I further explore the implications of this ideal by proposing that a commitment to deliberative democracy in multicultural America justifies a form of multicultural education that is, specifically race-conscious.

# 2

The 1AC is a fetish of so-called ‘successful’ movements of the past. Their attempt at academic change sustains the power’s ability to constrain dissent and suppress the victims of power into a ghostly remnant. The proposition that a ballot in this debate round can actually change anything ignores the coordinates of power and knowledge at play in academia – the only thing they do is feed more ammo to the machine

Occupied UC Berkeley 09, 11/19/09, (“The Necrosocial: Civic Life, Social Death, and the UC”, <http://anticapitalprojects.wordpress.com/2009/11/19/the-necrosocial/>, AW)

--- We don’t endorse the language in this card ---

Yes, very much a cemetery. Only here there are no dirges, no prayers, only the repeated testing of our threshold for anxiety, humiliation, and debt. The classroom just like the workplace just like the university just like the state just like the economy manages our social death, translating what we once knew from high school, from work, from our family life into academic parlance, into acceptable forms of social conflict. Who knew that behind so much civic life (electoral campaigns, student body representatives, bureaucratic administrators, public relations officials, Peace and Conflict Studies, ad nauseam) was so much social death? What postures we maintain to claim representation, what limits we assume, what desires we dismiss? And in this moment of crisis they ask us to twist ourselves in a way that they can hear. Petitions to Sacramento, phone calls to Congressmen—even the chancellor patronizingly congratulates our September 24th student strike, shaping the meaning and the force of the movement as a movement against the policies of Sacramento. He expands his institutional authority to encompass the movement. When students begin to hold libraries over night, beginning to take our first baby step as an autonomous movement he reins us in by serendipitously announcing library money. He manages movement, he kills movement by funneling it into the electoral process. He manages our social death. He looks forward to these battles on his terrain, to eulogize a proposition, to win this or that—he and his look forward to exhausting us. He and his look forward to a reproduction of the logic of representative governance, the release valve of the university plunges us into an abyss where ideas are wisps of ether—that is, meaning is ripped from action. Let’s talk about the fight endlessly, but always only in their managed form: to perpetually deliberate, the endless fleshing-out-of—when we push the boundaries of this form they are quick to reconfigure themselves to contain us: the chancellor’s congratulations, the reopening of the libraries, the managed general assembly—there is no fight against the administration here, only its own extension. Each day passes in this way, the administration on the look out to shape student discourse—it happens without pause, we don’t notice nor do we care to. It becomes banal, thoughtless. So much so that we see we are accumulating days: one semester, two, how close to being this or that, how far? This accumulation is our shared history. This accumulation—every once in a while interrupted, violated by a riot, a wild protest, unforgettable fucking, the overwhelming joy of love, life shattering heartbreak—is a muted, but desirous life. A dead but restless and desirous life. The university steals and homogenizes our time yes, our bank accounts also, but it also steals and homogenizes meaning. As much as capital is invested in building a killing apparatus abroad, an incarceration apparatus in California, it is equally invested here in an apparatus for managing social death. Social death is, of course, simply the power source, the generator, of civic life with its talk of reform, responsibility, unity. A ‘life,’ then, which serves merely as the public relations mechanism for death: its garrulous slogans of freedom and democracy designed to obscure the shit and decay in which our feet are planted. Yes, the university is a graveyard, but it is also a factory: a factory of meaning which produces civic life and at the same time produces social death. A factory which produces the illusion that meaning and reality can be separated; which everywhere reproduces the empty reactionary behavior of students based on the values of life (identity), liberty (electoral politics), and happiness (private property). Everywhere the same whimsical ideas of the future. Everywhere democracy. Everywhere discourse to shape our desires and distress in a way acceptable to the electoral state, discourse designed to make our very moments here together into a set of legible and fruitless demands. Totally managed death. A machine for administering death, for the proliferation of technologies of death. As elsewhere, things rule. Dead objects rule. In this sense, it matters little what face one puts on the university—whether Yudof or some other lackey. These are merely the personifications of the rule of the dead, the pools of investments, the buildings, the flows of materials into and out of the physical space of the university—each one the product of some exploitation—which seek to absorb more of our work, more tuition, more energy. The university is a machine which wants to grow, to accumulate, to expand, to absorb more and more of the living into its peculiar and perverse machinery: high-tech research centers, new stadiums and office complexes. And at this critical juncture the only way it can continue to grow is by more intense exploitation, higher tuition, austerity measures for the departments that fail to pass the test of ‘relevancy.’ But the ‘irrelevant’ departments also have their place. With their ‘pure’ motives of knowledge for its own sake, they perpetuate the blind inertia of meaning ostensibly detached from its social context. As the university cultivates its cozy relationship with capital, war and power, these discourses and research programs play their own role, co-opting and containing radical potential. And so we attend lecture after lecture about how ‘discourse’ produces ‘subjects,’ ignoring the most obvious fact that we ourselves are produced by this discourse about discourse which leaves us believing that it is only words which matter, words about words which matter. The university gladly permits the precautionary lectures on biopower; on the production of race and gender; on the reification and the fetishization of commodities. A taste of the poison serves well to inoculate us against any confrontational radicalism. And all the while power weaves the invisible nets which contain and neutralize all thought and action, that bind revolution inside books, lecture halls.There is no need to speak truth to power when power already speaks the truth. The university is a graveyard– así es. The graveyard of liberal good intentions, of meritocracy, opportunity, equality, democracy. Here the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. We graft our flesh, our labor, our debt to the skeletons of this or that social cliché. In seminars and lectures and essays, we pay tribute to the university’s ghosts, the ghosts of all those it has excluded—the immiserated, the incarcerated, the just-plain-fucked. They are summoned forth and banished by a few well-meaning phrases and research programs, given their book titles, their citations. This is our gothic—we are so morbidly aware, we are so practiced at stomaching horror that the horror is thoughtless.In this graveyard our actions will never touch, will never become the conduits of a movement, if we remain permanently barricaded within prescribed identity categories—our force will be dependent on the limited spaces of recognition built between us. Here we are at odds with one another socially, each of us: students, faculty, staff, homebums, activists, police, chancellors, administrators, bureaucrats, investors, politicians, faculty/ staff/ homebums/ activists/ police/ chancellors/ administrators/ bureaucrats/ investors/ politicians-to-be. That is, we are students, or students of color, or queer students of color, or faculty, or Philosophy Faculty, or Gender and Women Studies faculty, or we are custodians, or we are shift leaders—each with our own office, place, time, and given meaning. We form teams, clubs, fraternities, majors, departments, schools, unions, ideologies, identities, and subcultures—and thankfully each group gets its own designated burial plot. Who doesn’t participate in this graveyard? In the university we prostrate ourselves before a value of separation, which in reality translates to a value of domination. We spend money and energy trying to convince ourselves we’re brighter than everyone else. Somehow, we think, we possess some trait that means we deserve more than everyone else. We have measured ourselves and we have measured others. It should never feel terrible ordering others around, right? It should never feel terrible to diagnose people as an expert, manage them as a bureaucrat, test them as a professor, extract value from their capital as a businessman. It should feel good, gratifying, completing. It is our private wet dream for the future; everywhere, in everyone this same dream of domination. After all, we are intelligent, studious, young. We worked hard to be here, we deserve this. We are convinced, owned, broken. We know their values better than they do: life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness. This triumvirate of sacred values are ours of course, and in this moment of practiced theater—the fight between the university and its own students—we have used their words on their stages: Save public education! When those values are violated by the very institutions which are created to protect them, the veneer fades, the tired set collapses: and we call it injustice, we get indignant. We demand justice from them, for them to adhere to their values. What many have learned again and again is that these institutions don’t care for those values, not at all, not for all. And we are only beginning to understand that those values are not even our own. The values create popular images and ideals (healthcare, democracy, equality, happiness, individuality, pulling yourself up by your bootstraps, public education) while they mean in practice the selling of commodified identities, the state’s monopoly on violence, the expansion of markets and capital accumulation, the rule of property, the rule of exclusions based on race, gender, class, and domination and humiliation in general. They sell the practice through the image. We’re taught we’ll live the images once we accept the practice. In this crisis the Chancellors and Presidents, the Regents and the British Petroleums, the politicians and the managers, they all intend to be true to their values and capitalize on the university economically and socially—which is to say, nothing has changed, it is only an escalation, a provocation. Their most recent attempt to reorganize wealth and capital is called a crisis so that we are more willing to accept their new terms as well as what was always dead in the university, to see just how dead we are willing to play, how non-existent, how compliant, how desirous.

Their “try or die” framing re-inscribes the status quo’s limited scope of politics by maintaining the duality of forced choices as EITHER the aff OR the status quo – Refuse the choices as offered, demand a third option ­– embrace an imperceptible politics of the present

Stephenson et al 8, Dimitris Papadopoulos, PhD in Social Sciences from the Free University of Berlin, Niamh Stephenson, Senior Lecturer in Social Science the School of Public Health and Community Medicine, Vassils Tsianos, PhD Sociology Department of Social Sciences from the University of Hamburg, 2008, (“Escape Routes Control and Subversion in the Twenty-first Century”, <http://www.elimeyerhoff.com/books/Escape_routes.pdf>, AW)

Imperceptible politics is driven by imagination and fictionality – the imagination required to address an absence, as Santos (2003) describes it. As discussed above, representation diminishes the senses. Not only does representation dictate the terms of inclusion in political disputes of a certain field, it blunts our capacities even to perceive the multiple realities of bodies, people, desires – inappropriate/d forms of life (Trinh T. Minh-ha, 1987). These inappropriate/d modes of existence, this excess of social relations, remain after the existing regime of control has dissected and transformed subjectivities into controllable objects of discourse: bodies become identities, people become demos, desires become demands. Imperceptible politics starts from this excess of inappropriate/d modes of existence which from the perspective of the regime of control constitutes a void (Badiou, 2005a), a void residing in the political system of representation. As Badiou (2001, p. 68) says about the void, it is the very heart of a particular situation around which ‘the plenitude’ of social and material relations making up this specific situation is organised. This plenitude is mirrored, managed and regulated through procedures of representation (it is policed, as we said with Rancière in the previous chapter). Consider, for example, the surveillance and control of highly patrolled passages of migrational flows through the porous borders of Global North Atlantic countries. There is a plenitude of laws, practices, institutions, customs, migration police and border patrols, rituals, detention centres, informal migrant networks, knowledges, life projects and much more, which makes up this situation. This abundance is structured around an absence: the embodied and unrep- resentable desire which people follow as they cross borders despite the regime of control which tries to close them off or to constrain and control them. When they enter into the language of the plenitude, these people are called illegal migrants. They are treated as a problem, an economic, social or humanitarian problem, which has to be solved through deportation, revisiting legislation or negotiations with other states. What is absent is their actual movement, what people become as they navigate the fissures of nation states and borders. The absences of the inappropriate/d migrants and their desire constitute a void, a void around which this situation is organised. When all these inappropriate/d modes of existence beyond identity and passports become represented, it is only to be measured, policed, and finally, controlled. But they do not always become represented: when the void becomes an action, it does so as a force which challenges the existing organisation of plenitude in a certain field. Because it cannot be accommodated in the current situation within existing conditions of control, it is a constituent force pushing for a radical change. The imperceptible politics emanating from the void cannot be ignored. The millions of inappropriate/d bodies render borders permeable de facto, throw the current regime of control into disarray, force sovereignty to reassemble itself – everyday imperceptible politics becomes escape from a regime of control. Imperceptible politics is the moment when the void of mobility (or labour or life, as we show in the next sections) becomes subversive. Some may want to use the word resistance instead. But here we understand subversion (or resistance if you prefer) in a positive way: as the desire to depart from the plenitude which organises control in a certain field. Or better, as the trust in something which is absent and unrepresentable, and yet operative and constitutive of a specific field. This desire comes from the very heart of the situation, but leads directly and unconditionally beyond it. Desire. Trust. Escape! This is the only understanding of resistance which is relevant for imperceptible politics, and it is indeed the only understanding of resistance which escapes the melancholic uptake of Foucault’s work in neoliberal times. This is the reason why we prefer to talk of subversion instead of resistance in this book. Drawing on Johannes Agnoli’s (1996) intriguing exploration of the historical metamorphoses of this concept, we understand subversion as the process of reclaiming a form of praxis which is there but is forgotten, suppressed and rendered seemingly absent. It is an act which cannot be understood as critique, or as a form of dialectical negation of negation, or even resistance but it stands there as ‘negation sans phrase’ (Agnoli, 1996, p. 16), that is conceptual and theoretical work which obtains its efficacy only through ‘laborious mole-work’ (Agnoli, 1996, p. 226). Subversion is that which is banished and eradicated through political representation, yet never completely. As an act of reclaiming, the subversion entailed in imperceptible politics is located in the everyday and precedes and prepares the practice of escape itself. Subversion remains imperceptible to the representational policing of a field and works with an excess of social relations which spring from the ‘absent centre’ of this particular field. This is the fictional and imaginary character of imperceptible politics. It is only by conjuring up the speculative and fictional qualities (see previous chapter and Haraway, 1992, 2004) of a situation that it is possible to address something which is absent and yet there, something arising from the core of the situation but which is yet to emerge. Imperceptible politics is here, always present within a regime of control, cultivating trust in speculative figurations of a radically different future in the present. Imperceptible politics is here.

# 3

Rhetorical silence protects the invisibility of whiteness and preserves material white privilege.

Crenshaw ‘97 [1997, Carrie, PhD, Prof of Speech Comm @ Univ. Ala. former director of debate @ Univ. of Ala.; WESTERN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION; Resisting Whiteness’ Rhetorical Silence; 61(3), Summer; pp. 253-278]

This analysis brings into focus several observations about how whiteness operates rhetorically and ideologically in public political discourse. First, the ideology of white privilege maintains its invisibility through rhetorical silence. Rhetorical silence protects the invisibility of whiteness because it both reflects and sustains the assumption that to be white is the “natural condition,” the assumed norm. Rhetorical silence about whiteness preserves material white privilege because it masks its existence and makes the denial of white privilege plausible. Hall argues that language is the principle medium of ideologies because ideologies are sets or chains of meaning which are located in language. However, ideologies also “work” through rhetorical silences which conceal privilege. Ideological systems are made up of both presences and absences because positively marked terms ‘signify’ “in relation to what is absent, unmarked, the unspoken, the unsayable” (Hall, “Signification” 109). In this case, the ideology of white privilege “works” through rhetorical silence about whiteness.

Racism must be rejected in EVERY INSTANCE without surcease. It justifies atrocities, creates another and is truly the CAPITAL SIN.

Memmi ’00 [2000, Albert is a Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ Unv. Of Paris, Albert-; RACISM, translated by Steve Martinot, pp.163-165]

The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved, yet for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken without surcease and without concessions. One cannot be indulgent toward racism. One cannot even let the monster in the house, especially not in a mask. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people which is to diminish what is human. To accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. It is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which [person] man is not [themself] himself an outsider relative to someone else?). Racism illustrates in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated; that is it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animality to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduct only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. It is a choice among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism because racism signifies the exclusion of the other and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is “the truly capital sin.”fn22 It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical counsel respect for the weak, for orphans, widows or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. But no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall,” says the bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming once again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal – indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality. Because, in the end, the ethical choice commands the political choice. A just society must be a society accepted by all. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday to live in peace. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.

# Case

Cap inevitable – institutions and existing governmentality

Adam Przeworski, Carroll and Milton Petrie Professor of European Studies; Professor of Politics, Economics Postdoctoral (sociology), Polish Academy of Sciences; Ph.D. (political science), Northwestern; M.A. (philosophy and sociology), February 24, 2003, Interview with Adam Przeworski conducted and edited by Gerardo L. Munck, “ADAM PRZEWORSKI: CAPITALISM, DEMOCRACY AND SCIENCE”, PDF, ONLINE, KENTUCKY

A: I was a Marxist, and I was trying to make political sense of social democracy. My question was, why was there no revolution in the West? Marxism offered a theory, that I thought was generally reasonable, which said that in industrialized countries there should be a revolution supported, if not led, by an organized working class. Yet the obvious observation was that there was no revolution and there probably wouldn’t be one. I was trying to figure out why not. I was also very influenced by Chile and its history of socialism. I was living in Chile in 1970/71, the first year of Allende’s government,9 and this made me think about the feasibility of a strategy of gradual transformation of capitalist society. The Allende experience raised the question: Is it a viable strategy for socialists to compete in elections and enact reforms that have majority electoral support? This question led me to turn to Europe, to see what happened historically with the project to achieve socialist reforms in Europe. My research agenda on social democracy evolved. Initially, around 1970, I was interested in studying the extension of the suffrage from the perspective of “the legalization of the working class,” the title of a French book: I no longer remember the author. I was interested in why elites who enjoy voting rights are willing to extend these rights to others, and, in turn, why workers were willing to use these voting rights and work within the system rather than attempt to destroy it, a topic that became recently fashionable among economists. Eventually, my thinking evolved from a more narrow focus on the extensions of the suffrage and the decision of early socialists to participate in electoral politics to a broader understanding of social democracy. In this broader perspective, I thought two questions needed to be answered. One concerned socialist parties and the electoral process: why did socialists decide to struggle for the suffrage and use it for reformist goals? The second concerned economic strategy: why were the socialists willing not to nationalize the means of production once they had the power of government? Q: What are the main conclusions you drew from this research? A: The central thing I learned was that reformism was a rational strategy for workers. It was in the interest of workers to support capitalist democracy. An electoral victory of pure workers’ parties was not historically feasible, because the assumption that manual workers in industry and transportation would one day become the overwhelming majority of the population in industrializing countries was mistaken. That meant that socialist parties could not win elections solely by representing workers; they could only win by acting as a catch-all, multi-class party. To achieve this, they had to broaden their appeal beyond the specific interests of workers The second thing I learned, working with Michael Wallerstein,10 is that workers face a trade-off between the goals of income distribution and economic growth and, under certain conditions, the optimal strategy for workers in the long run may be to limit their distributional claims. By exercising wage restraint, workers induce capitalist to invest, which causes the economy to grow. Hence, workers end up ahead. So, the social democratic strategy of class compromise had a rational basis. Q: Were there any particular authors you were arguing against in your work on social democracy? A: I was arguing against an entire socialist tradition—from Lenin to Trotsky, Lukacs, and Luxemburg—that saw social democrats as traitors. That was the main target of my polemic. More pointedly, there is a passage that Marx wrote in 1850 in Class Struggles in France that says that the combination of private property and universal suffrage is impossible.11 This phrase, which Marx repeats in other works, was my target. It was obvious that private property and universal suffrage could exist together, but it was far from clear why. The leftist tradition— radical socialism of every variety—said basically that if the combination of private property and universal suffrage is possible, it’s because social democrats are “traitors.” My view was that social democrats were not traitors. Rather, they did as well as they could under the circumstances. My position is captured in Engels’ phrase that “ballots became paper stones,” which I use as the title of one of my books.12 Engels came to hold the position that universal suffrage is in fact an effective instrument for advancing workers’ interests and that it was no longer necessary to build barricades, because ballots could be used to win office. The power of elected officers, in turn, could be used to transform capitalist societies.

Globalization is entrenched and accelerating in Latin America

Hogenboom and Jilberto 12 – associate professor of Political Science at the Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation in Amsterdam, and senior lecturer in International Relations at the University of Amsterdam (Barbara Hogenboom Alex E. Fernández Jilberto, “Neo-liberalism, big business and the evolution of interest group activity in Latin America” Journal of Public Affairs, May 21 2012, Wiley Online Library)

Consequently, neo-liberal policies put an end—at least for a long while—to the concept that the state had to take a leading role in the economy to achieve industrialization. Privatizations of public enterprises together with policies of economic liberalization and deregulation had two major effects on big business in Latin America: an expansion of large companies across the region, plus financial and industrial corporate groups increasingly globalized their operations and investments. With conglomerates and economic groups going through such rapid growth and change, Latin America witnessed a process of economic concentration and transnationalization in the private sector (Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2004). Next to transnational companies (TNCs—sometimes referred to as multinational corporations—MNCs) from industrialized countries, Latin American conglomerates have profited substantially from neo-liberal policies. Most of these ‘multilatinas’ are nowadays MNCs producing or selling or both in several countries. However, there are only a few regional giants, such as the Mexican cement company Cemex with substantive activities outside of Latin America. Nevertheless, through exports, financial markets, mergers and joint ventures, Latin America's large companies have become increasingly linked to global capital and the global economy at large. These developments in the structure and operations of large economic enterprises, both its regionalization and internationalization, set in motion an evolution—some would argue a transformation—of the political power of big business and its role in Latin America's interest group systems. Ironically, big business was able to enhance its political influence in the face of developments that might otherwise appear to undermine its power. One major development that would logically appear to have undermined the influence of business in the 1980s and 1990s was the move in the region to democracy. In the space of under 15 years, 1976–1990, Latin America moved from having only three of its 20 countries as liberal democracies to Cuba being the only exception. It might be assumed that with this increased pluralization of politics and presumably interest group activity, the special status of big business as an influential interest would be undermined. A second factor that might be seen as reducing its political influence is that neo-liberal SAPs would undermine the insider status of business with government in terms of protection from foreign competition, guaranteed contracts and other privileges, that in many cases, led to some businesses controlling (capturing in interest group terminology) government agencies and segments of public policy. Third, although multilatinas and TNCs expanded, economic growth and development remained weak, several crises hit the region and increasing social and political resistance gave way to a strong anti-neo-liberal current and during the last 10 years, to electoral victories of the left. Given these three and other factors, how can we explain the increased prominence of big business in politics and in many ways, its enhanced influence as a political interest? Reviewing the confluence of economic restructuring with economic crises, the process of business consolidation and the nature of public sector support in these fluid and challenging times provide several insights. NEO-LIBERAL RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATIZING IN AN ERA OF FINANCIAL CRISES At least in the early years of economic restructuring in Latin America, democratization was not a major challenge to the neo-liberal agenda. The various economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s were used by proponents of economic reforms to argue in favour of new policies, but their negative effects also presented a challenge to the implementing of neo-liberal policies. Big business, however, was able to turn these crises and new policies to its advantage.

Capitalism isn’t the root cause of war – there’s just no impact

Roberts and Sparke 3 (Susan, Professor of Geography – University of Kentucky, and Matthew, Professor of Geography – University of Washington, “Neoliberal Geopolitics,” Antipode, 35(5), p. 886-897)

Barnett’s work is our main example in this paper of a more widespread form of neoliberal geopolitics implicated in the war-making. This geopolitical world vision, we argue, is closely connected to neoliberal idealism about the virtues of free markets, openness, and global economic integration. Yet, linked as it was to an extreme form of American unilateralism, we further want to highlight how the neoliberal geopolitics of the war planners illustrated the contradictory dependency of multilateral neoliberal deregulation on enforced re-regulation and, in particular, on the deadly and far from multilateral re-regulation represented by the “regime change” that has now been enforced on Iraq. Such re-regulation underlines the intellectual importance of studying how neoliberal marketization dynamics are hybridized and supplemented by various extra-economic forces.2 Rather than making neoliberalism into a totalizing economic master narrative, we therefore suggest that it is vital to examine its inter-articulation with certain dangerous supplements, including, not least of all, the violence of American military force. We are not arguing that the war is completely explainable in terms of neoliberalism, nor that neoliberalism is reducible to American imperialism. Instead, the point is to explore how a certain globalist and economistic view of the world, one associated with neoliberalism, did service in legitimating the war while simultaneously finessing America’s all too obvious departure from the “end of the nation-state” storyline.

[Continues]As we said at the start, we do not want to claim too much for neoliberalism. It cannot explain everything, least of all the diverse brutalities of what happened in Iraq. Moreover, in connecting neoliberal norms to the vagaries of geopolitics, we risk corrupting the analytical purchase of neoliberalism on more clearly socioeconomic developments. By the same token, we also risk obscuring the emergence of certain nonmilitarist geoeconomic visions of global and local space that have gone hand in hand with neoliberal globalization (see Sparke 1998, 2002; Sparke and Lawson 2003). But insofar as the specific vision of neoliberal geopolitics brought many neoliberals to support the war (including, perhaps, Britain’s Tony Blair as well as Americans such as Friedman), insofar as it helped thereby also to facilitate the planning and overarching coordination of the violence, and insofar as the war showed how the extension of neoliberal practices on a global scale has come to depend on violent interventions by the US, it seems vital to reflect on the inter-articulations.

Ethical obligations are tautological—the only coherent rubric is to maximize number of lives saved

Greene 2010 – Associate Professor of the Social Sciences Department of Psychology Harvard University (Joshua, Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul”, [www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf](http://www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf))

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is anyrationallycoherentnormativemoral theory that can accommodateourmoral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization.

It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide.  How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977).

Missing the Deontological Point
I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstoodwhatKant and like-minded deontologistsare all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b).This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are notdistinctivelydeontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view.
In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people asmereobjects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-beingin the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be.
What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will getcharacteristically deontological answers. Some will betautological: "Because it's murder!"Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about thembecause they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

No endless intervention

David Mathieson and, Associate Fellow at FRIDE. He holds a doctorate from the University of London, Richard Youngs 6, Co-ordinator of the Democratisation programme at FRIDE, and lecturer at the University of Warwick, “Democracy Promotion and the European Left: Ambivalence Confused?”, December, working paper 29 at FRIDE

Equally important, leftist analysts and politicians on the other (pro-Iraq invasion) side of the debate must also de-link their views on Iraq from the broader democracy agenda. A fixation with justifying the Iraq invasion from a progressive point of view is also in danger of obscuring a clearer vision on more proactive democracy promotion.29 This ‘democracy by force’ debate is a diversion. One analyst points out that this debate has dragged the European left into rallying forcefully behind the ‘imperialism’ judged to lie behind a small number of interventions, but to ignore the far larger number of cases around the world where the West has by its inaction and silence been complicit with autocracy.30 There is no prospect of a far-reaching ‘doctrine of democratic intervention’. Debate at the multilateral level has long settled on the view that an absence of democracy cannot in itself justify military intervention in a particular country. At least for the present, no state appears likely to challenge this. The morality of military intervention is of course a crucial issue for international ethics; but, the core business of democracy promotion is essentially about civilian strategies. It is here where the left must engage and have something more creative and productive to say. More than any other foreign policy issue of modern times, Iraq has split the European left. Some important points have been made, not least those around the validity of international law and the efficacy of using armies for regime change. But the debate has also been damaging and confused. When not actively disagreeing with each other some on the left have appeared simply to be talking at cross-purposes. Tony Blair’s speeches abound with references linking democracy with firmness whilst Zapatero constantly stresses the need for democracy through non-prescriptive dialogue. The European left risks regressing to an unsatisfactory binary distinction between ‘intervention’ and ‘doing nothing’ in non-democratic countries. Ironically, while it lambasts US military power, the left itself appears to have slid back towards a Westphalian view of international relations, reversing the evolution in its own internal debates during the 1990s.

There’s no environment impact

Rifkin 10 – Jeremy Rifkin, President of the Foundation on Economic Trends, January 11, 2010, “'The Empathic Civilization': Rethinking Human Nature in the Biosphere Era,” online: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-rifkin/the-empathic-civilization\_b\_416589.html

The pivotal turning points in human consciousness occur when new energy regimes converge with new communications revolutions, creating new economic eras. The new communications revolutions become the command and control mechanisms for structuring, organizing and managing more complex civilizations that the new energy regimes make possible. For example, in the early modern age, print communication became the means to organize and manage the technologies, organizations, and infrastructure of the coal, steam, and rail revolution. It would have been impossible to administer the first industrial revolution using script and codex.¶ Communication revolutions not only manage new, more complex energy regimes, but also change human consciousness in the process. Forager/hunter societies relied on oral communications and their consciousness was mythologically constructed. The great hydraulic agricultural civilizations were, for the most part, organized around script communication and steeped in theological consciousness. The first industrial revolution of the 19th century was managed by print communication and ushered in ideological consciousness. Electronic communication became the command and control mechanism for arranging the second industrial revolution in the 20th century and spawned psychological consciousness.¶ Each more sophisticated communication revolution brings together more diverse people in increasingly more expansive and varied social networks. Oral communication has only limited temporal and spatial reach while script, print and electronic communications each extend the range and depth of human social interaction.¶ By extending the central nervous system of each individual and the society as a whole, communication revolutions provide an evermore inclusive playing field for empathy to mature and consciousness to expand. For example, during the period of the great hydraulic agricultural civilizations characterized by script and theological consciousness, empathic sensitivity broadened from tribal blood ties to associational ties based on common religious affiliation. Jews came to empathize with Jews, Christians with Christians, Muslims with Muslims, etc. In the first industrial revolution characterized by print and ideological consciousness, empathic sensibility extended to national borders, with Americans empathizing with Americans, Germans with Germans, Japanese with Japanese and so on. In the second industrial revolution, characterized by electronic communication and psychological consciousness, individuals began to identify with like-minded others.¶ Today, we are on the cusp of another historic convergence of energy and communication--a third industrial revolution--that could extend empathic sensibility to the biosphere itself and all of life on Earth. The distributed Internet revolution is coming together with distributed renewable energies, making possible a sustainable, post-carbon economy that is both globally connected and locally managed.¶ In the 21st century, hundreds of millions--and eventually billions--of human beings will transform their buildings into power plants to harvest renewable energies on site, store those energies in the form of hydrogen and share electricity, peer-to-peer, across local, regional, national and continental inter-grids that act much like the Internet. The open source sharing of energy, like open source sharing of information, will give rise to collaborative energy spaces--not unlike the collaborative social spaces that currently exist on the Internet.¶ When every family and business comes to take responsibility for its own small swath of the biosphere by harnessing renewable energy and sharing it with millions of others on smart power grids that stretch across continents, we become intimately interconnected at the most basic level of earthly existence by jointly stewarding the energy that bathes the planet and sustains all of life.¶ The new distributed communication revolution not only organizes distributed renewable energies, but also changes human consciousness. The information communication technologies (ICT) revolution is quickly extending the central nervous system of billions of human beings and connecting the human race across time and space, allowing empathy to flourish on a global scale, for the first time in history.¶

## 2NC

### 2NC – Getting Mad at the Aff

#### The battle for the public sphere is over—in fact, I’m going to read a 1AC card because it’s such a good K card – they’ve underestimated the extent of institutional power – the truth is that all their args about why the alt can’t solve just reflect the extent of bureaucratic control – that even their knowledge and acceptance of more radical alternatives are silenced. The truth is, the aff can’t solve because everything they know is distorted and controlled by norms of knowledge controlled by the university. Only the alt has subversive potential

McLaren 05 [Peter McLaren, professor of urban education at the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, Capitalist and Conquerors: A Critical Pedagogy Against Empire, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005, pages 22-23]

Today’s international political economy is the toast of the global ruling class, and the bourgeoisié see it as their biggest opportunity in decades to join their ranks. Free-marketeers have been given the New World Order’s imprimatur to loot and exploit the planet’s resources and to invest in global markets without restriction. The menacing concomitant of capital’s destructive juggernaut is the obliteration of any hope for civilization, let alone democracy. While liberals are plumping for fairer distribution of economic resources, the working classes are taught to feel grateful for the maquiladoras that are now sprouting up in countries designated to provide the cheap labor and dumping grounds for pollution for the Western democracies. They are taught that socialism and communism are congenitally evil and can only lead to a totalitarian dictatorship. In short, capitalism and the legitimacy of private monopoly ownership has been naturalized as common sense. It is no longer just the capitalists who believe that they are the salvation for the world‘s poor, but the workers themselves have become conditioned to believe that without their exploiters, they would no longer exist. The entrails of the eviscerated poor now serve as divining mechanisms for the soothsayers of the investment corporations. Even many trade unions have been little more than adjuncts of the state, reimposing the discipline of capital’s law of value. Those who wish to avoid both Communist-type centralized planning and the disequilibrium and instability of laissez-faire capitalism have turned to a type of market socialism through labor-managed firms, but doing little to challenge the deep grammar of capital itself. Everywhere we look, social relations of oppression and contempt for human dignity abound. It is not that workers are being press—ganged to serve in the social factory; it is more that they are being made to feel grateful for having some source of income, as meager as that may be. As the demagogues of capitalist neoliberal globalization spin their web of lies about the benefits of “global trade” behind erected “security” walls, protesters are gassed, beaten, and killed. As the media boast about the net worth of corporate moguls and celebrate the excesses of the rich and famous, approximately 2.8 billion people—almost half of the world’s people—struggle in desperation to live on less than two dollars (U.S.) a day (McQuaig 2001, p. 27). The “free-market revolution,” driven by continuous capitalist accumulation of a Winner-take-all variety, has left the social infrastructure of the United States in tatters (not to mention other parts of the globe). Through policies of increasing its military-industrial-financial interests, it continues to purse its quivering bourgeois lips, bare its imperialist fangs, and suck the lifeblood from the open veins of South America and other regions of the globe. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union in the 19905 and the shift to capitalism in Eastern Europe has brought nearly five billion people into the world market. The globalization of capitalism and its political bedfellow, neoliberalism, work together to democratize suffering, obliterate hope, and assassinate justice. The logic of privatization and free trade—where social labor is the means and measure of value and surplus social labor lies at the heart of odiously shapes archetypes of citizenship, manages our perceptions of What should constitute the “good society,” and creates ideological formations that produce necessary functions for capital in relation to labor. Schools have been effectively transformed into holding pens where students exercise their everyday consciousness, assert their private interests, articulate their practical intentions, and dream their secret lives within given capitalist social relations and objective forms of thought that emerge from categories of bourgeois social economy, which themselves are bound up with the structural characteristics of stages of social development. The ideological formations intergenerationally reproduced within schools betray a pragmatic efficacy and validity of apologetic purpose as well as the fetishistic character of everyday thinking. Such formations help to orient students into an unreflexive acceptance of the capitalist social world. Of course, the accession into the social order has always been incomplete, always in process, in that there has always been a space between self—formation and its dismemberment. Critical pedagogy seizes upon this space as its major terrain of struggle.

#### Want a link? This 1AC card couldn’t be more explicit – the aff reifies institutionalized knowledge and by tipping their hand for revolution and social activism they’ve revealed their strategy

**McLaren 05** [Peter McLaren, professor of urban education at the Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, Capitalist and Conquerors: A Critical Pedagogy Against Empire, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005, pages 206-208]

In **our contemporary urban world**, a world that is “rushing backwards to the age of Dickens,” that **has approximately 921 million slum dwellers** nearly equal to the population of the world when the young Engels first ventured onto the mean streets of Manchester,” and where, by 2020, “urban poverty in the world could reach 45 to 50 percent of the total population living in cities” (Davis 2004), how can we move forward? In our crumbling urban universe where the global informal working class “is the fastest growing and most unprecedented social class on earth” and where “only the slum remains as a fully franchised solution to the problem of warehousing the twenty-first century’s surplus humanity” (Davis, 2004), how can we defeat the rock-ribbed custodians of capital? **Capitalist globalization and its imperialist stepchildren cannot be defeated by cooperative efforts on the part of interimperialist rivals. It requires mass struggle by the working classes worldwide.** To defeat capitalist globalization and the accumulation of corporate profits by private owners **means** developing a philosophy **that can help us to organize praxis to this end. Our position as revolutionary critical** educators **is to support continent-wide mobilizations against the neoliberal offensive and the Washington consensus**whose objective is to turn back all the social rights achieved over the past half century**. We advocate a gender-balanced, multiracial opposition to imperialism, to war, to capitalist globalization, to the law-and-order policies that have made a mockery of our democratic freedoms and that institutionalize violence**against the most vulnerable groups in our society. We **challenge the productivist model of development that puts the future of humanity at risk and we demand democratic control over choices of development and of production. In doing so, we steadfastly refuse to submit to social liberalism, which controls the** institutions of the state **in the interests of the minority who own all the wealth, and we work toward a socialist** alternative to capitalism so that social needs are satisfied. Here we advocate the politics of internationalism, especially in light of the **rise in power of social movements**and continental social forums. **We refer to diverse groups that 3**

### 2NC – Disaster Capitalism

#### The commodification of experience reinforces the debate economy – playing a game where we move scenarios of suffering around like chess pieces for personal enjoyment – that’s the most unethical form of intellectual imperialism

Baudrillard 94 [Jean, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-71]

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' [['autre monde]. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source.¶ We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history.¶ The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground . Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market ); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.¶ In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself , in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world.¶ Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures.

### 2NC – AT: Permutation

#### The permutation scripts the resistance that the alternative can engage in by defining them as per the 1ac—refuse this framing as one that eviscerates agency – it links to all our offense

Peggy Phelan 96, chair of New York University's Department of Performance Studies, Unmarked: the politics of performance, 26-7

Representation is almost always on the side of the one who looks and almost never on the side of the one who is seen. As feminist film theorists have demonstrated, the fetishized image of the female star serves as a deeply revealing screen for the construction of men’s desire. The image of the woman displays not the subjectivity of the woman who is seen, but rather the constituent forces of desire of the man who wants to see her. 38 Visibility and invisibility are crucially bound; invisibility polices visibility and in this specific sense functions as the ascendant term in the binary. Gaining visibility for the politically under-represented without scrutinizing the power of who is required to display what to whom is an impoverished political agenda. Within the psychic and aesthetic economy of the Western gaze, the visible image of the other necessarily becomes a cipher for the looking self. To overturn these economies the failure of the inward gaze to produce self-seeing needs to be acknowledged. If one could confront the internal/external other as always already lost one would not have to rely so heavily on the image of the external other to produce what the looker lacks. This suggestion is not a refusal of multicultural diversity or of a more inclusive representational landscape. It is rather a way to isolate the impotency of the inward gaze as a fundamental aspect of representational economies.

## 1NR

### 2NC Racism Bad ☹

D-Rule

Barndt, 1991 (Joseph, co-director of Crossroads, an organization that focuses on addressing racism, Dismantling Racism, p.155-6)

To study racism is to study walls. We have looked at barriers and fences, restraints and limitations, ghettos and prisons. The prison of racism confines us all, people of color and white people alike. It shackles the victimizer as well as the victim. The walls forcibly keep people of color and white people separate from each other in our separate prisons we are all prevented from achieving the human potential that God intends for us. The limitations imposed on people of color by poverty, subservience, and powerlessness are cruel, inhuman, and unjust; the effects of uncontrolled power, privilege, and greed, which are marks of our white prison, will inevitably destroy us as well. But we have also seen that the walls of racism can be dismantled. We are not condemned to an inexorable fate, but are offered the vision and the possibility of freedom. Brick by brick, stone by stone, the prison of individual, institutional, and cultural racism can be destroyed. You and I are urgently called to join the efforts of those who know it is time to tear down, once and for all, the walls of racism. The danger point of self-destruction seems to be drawing ever more near. The results of centuries of national and worldwide conquest and colonialism, of military buildups and violent aggression, of overconsumption and environmental destruction may be reaching a point of no return. A small and predominantly white minority of the global population derives its power and privileges from the suffering of the vast majority of people of color. For the sake of the world and ourselves, we dare not allow it to continue.

Racism is the root cause of capitalism – Marxist theory independently cannot solve racism

**WEST Honorary chair of the Democratic Socialist of America 1988**

Cornell-prof @Princeton University, DSA National Politicall Committee and a member of its African American Commission; *“Toward a Socialist Theory of Racism”*; RACE & ETHNICITY ESERV; <http://race.eserver.org/toward-a-theory-of-racism.html> (year of publication found on Dr. West’s website: <http://www.pragmatism.org/library/west/>)

This brief **examination of past Marxist views leads to one conclusion. Marxist theory is indispensable yet ultimately inadequate for grasping the complexity of racism as a historical phenomenon.** Marxism is indispensable because it highlights the relation of racist practices to the capitalist mode of production and recognizes the crucial role racism plays within the capitalist economy. Yet **Marxism is inadequate because it fails to probe other spheres of American society where racism plays an integral role--especially the psychological and cultural spheres. Furthermore, Marxist views tend to assume that racism has its roots in the rise of modern capitalism. Yet, it can easily be shown that although racist practices were shaped and appropriated by modern capitalism, racism itself predates capitalism. Its roots lie in the earlier encounters between the civilizations of Europe, Africa, Asia, and Latin America--encounters that occurred long before the rise of modern capitalism**.

It indeed is true that the very category of "race"--denoting primarily skin color--was first employed as a means of classifying human bodies by Francois Bernier, a French physician, in 1684. The first authoritative racial division of humankind is found in the influential Natural System (1735) of the preeminent naturalist of the 18th century, Caroluc Linnaeus. Both of these instances reveal European racist practices at the level of intellectual codificaton since both degrade and devalue non-Europeans. Racist folktales, mythologies, legends, and stories that function in the everyday life of common people predate the 17th and 18th centuries. For example, Christian anti-Semitism and Euro-Christian antiblackism were rampant throughout the Middle Ages. These false divisions of humankind were carried over to colonized Latin America where anti-Indian racism became a fundamental pillar of colonial society and influenced later mestizo national development. Thus **racism is as much a product of the interaction of cultural ways of life as it is of modern capitalism. A more adequate conception of racism should reflect this twofold context of cultural and economic realities in which racism has flourished**.

### 2NC LINK OF EDINA PH

Independently the fact that they read this aff just proves our argument – they are white students and the affirmative’s neoliberal focus is an example of white privilege – capitalist movements are color blind

**Green 2003**, ANNE GREEN, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF ENGLISH AT SAINT JOSEPH’S UNIVERSITY, DIRECTOR OF THE WRITING CENTER, 2003 [DIFFICULT STORIES: SERVICE-LEARNING, RACE, CLASS, AND WHITENESS, JSTOR, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF TEACHERS]

I think a lot about my mother's story when I think about how my white students talk about race and racism. [with] The stories that **white students tell about learning about race are ones of denial, and they often express "color blind" ideas about race.** It's impolite, As a white child in the North, what I they feel, to acknowledge race because "people are learned about race was very similar to people." As Robert T. Carter describes color blind what my white students have learnedness, "one first recognizes a person's color and then about race-that race should be claims to ignore it" (201). The messages that student unacknowledged and avoided. dents describe receiving about race generally come from their parents who tell them "what matters is on the inside." As **a white child in the North, what I learned about race was very similar to what my white students have learned about race-that race should be unacknowledged and avoided.** Hephzibah Roskelly writes, **"[T]he primary way that white students and their teachers ignore what they know about how racism works is by claiming class instead of race as the real discriminator in society and culture.**" While I agree with Roskelly, I also think that white privilege and middle class privilege work in similar ways, erasing the specifics of race and class and the ways that race and class intersect, reinforcing the American myths of individual success ("Rising" 198). White people "do not talk about White racism" (Sleeter 5) and "Whites, while socialized in a racially constructed world, are taught not to be aware of themselves in racial terms" (Carter 199). Most of my white students have almost as difficult a time naming themselves as middle class as they do as white, and it's this intersection of white privilege and middle class privilege that becomes particularly difficult to unpack. **Teaching white, middle class students about white privilege and white racism "challenges the legitimacy of White peoples' very lives" and also highlights the ways in which oppressions intersect and collide** (Sleeter 7). It can make it possible to discuss and unpack the assumption that "for some to have good lives there must be others whose lives are truncated and brutal" (Allison 35). It is extremely difficult for white students to talk and write about systemic racial inequalities and white privilege.8 As Roskelly describes it, **"race and racism continue to be matters that white university professors and the students in their literature and writing courses avoid**, except in the most abstract, and therefore safe, ways" ("Rising" 198). In my service-learning class we had problems addressing race, whiteness, and white racism other than abstractly, although the service experience provided concrete opportunities to consider systemic racism and how that has affected inner-city environments. This two-semester required English course provided a yearlong service-learning experience for first-year students. In addition to the regular work of a composition course (fall semester) and a writing-about-literature course (spring semester), students tutored children or adults three hours per week. To help While the most obvious difference was race (we were all white, and the learners were largely African American), the service-learning students sat in silence. They refused to name racism as a possible cause of the difficulties that brought people to their service-learning sites, and they could not name their whiteness as a source of privilege. with the affective goals of our service-learning program, some time is organized for reflection and discussion outside of class. During our final "reflection dinner," we asked students to articulate the systemic reasons that defined the differences between those at their service sites and themselves. One of the upper-level students who mentored my service-learning students questioned them about the differences they might notice if the learners from their sites were standing together on the other side of the room. While the most obvious difference was race (we were all white, and the learners were largely African American), the service-learning students sat in silence. They refused to name racism as a possible cause of the difficulties that brought people to their service-learning sites, and they could not name their whiteness as a source of privilege. This was only one of many times when the service learning **students avoided talking about race.**

### 2NC LINK OF CAPITALISM

Must address race first, neo-liberalism is used to MASK racial inequalities.

**WARD Univ. of Illinois @ Urbana-Champaign 2k7**

Robert Anthony-; *Neoliberal Silences, Race, & The Hope of CRT*; A paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Research Association; April Draft;

<http://www.urban.illinois.edu/apa-pw/APA07/Neoliberal%20Silences_Robert%20Ward.pdf>

**Neoliberalism fosters an economic theory of democracy. The idea is that democracy is commodified at the price of political liberalism, subordinating the state to the market.** Highlighting the parallel between economic and political markets. Neoliberal policy in the development of charter schools does not create an “equal playing field”, in contrast, by undoing the memory of past discrimination, and unseating our historical consciousness of institutional discrimination it seeks to overlook civic values in the interest of developing commercial interests. The need through actualizing the academic function of education to place individuals in the division of labor and integrate them into the workforce (distributive and economic functions of education) takes precedent for charters and is disconnected from concepts of the social, justice, or civic responsibility. **As such, colorblindness negates relationships between racial difference and power. The danger in such an ideological approach** to educational policy and other implications **is that the “rhetoric of color-blindness is commonly used as a pretext to continue to justify hierarchical racial divisions** (Parker, 2003, 150).”

**Though market ideology virtually ignores notions of race, the history of racialization and discrimination** in both the national and New Orleans context **are implicit in every facet** of the restructuring process. **Through a shift in focus from individual actors or governing bodies** determining school structures **to the market as the primary delineator, power is “uncoupled from matters of ethics and social responsibility** (Giroux, 2004, 59).” **Thus, social responsibility is shifted from the state and those governing bodies onto the poor and oppressed groups and historical discriminatory policies and treatments forgotten.** Under **the neoliberal approach** to education through charter schools, market ideology replaces longstanding social contracts that sought equality and opportunities that public schools were hoped to one day fulfill. The chartering of public education **is representative of a much larger effort that is deeply ingrained in America’s racial consciousness, in whiteness, and in the new left’s attempts to position class over the legacy of racialization in America.** **Market ideology is the triumph of capital over politics as well as morality. It is the triumph of economic logic over all other domains of human existence, and therefore represents the end of history** (Giroux 2004).

The promotion of a new relationship between government and knowledge: the development of new forms of social accounting and expertise (via technological advances) to promote notions of government at a distance. The notion of educational reform for “equal educational opportunity” finds little material import and is purely ideological at best. Major criticism levied on both reform movements since the mid 1950’s and research such as the landmarks studies of the *Coleman Report* and the work of Jencks, and Bowles and Gintis are extensive in scope. Of particular interest are that reforms and research to this end were all results based with a primary focus on individualism, competition, and meritocracy. Also, the ideological stance of “equal educational opportunity” concentrates too heavily on site based reform, choosing to view schools as autonomous instead of as closely tied to the wider society of racial segregation mechanisms, the labor market, and the state itself. Finally, the too little consideration in reform language considers the question of what education is and seeks to accomplish, besides being viewed as purely functional (Burbules & Sherman 1979).

**This is to say that without reform addressing past discrimination by way of race and class then reform initiatives are not only still inequitable and unequal but still in fact discriminatory.**

Particularly through reform initiatives using market ideology, but also in discussions of educational equity in general, too little attention is paid to the fact that American public education “depends heavily on local property taxes, and inequalities in tax revenues among school districts produce inequalities in educational resources, facilities, programs, and opportunities (Walters, 2001, 44).” Whereas the federal response is for local and state governance to turn to market ideology to solve the questions of equal educational opportunities, particularly in urban districts, **what ends up occurring is that the market ideology approach** to education **veils how racial histories accrue political, economic, and cultural weight to the power of whiteness.** **This occurs simply by virtue of refusal to acknowledge it.** As a final point from the establishment of common schools in the early 19th century to the market approach to education in the present day, “racial inequality in educational funding and other forms of educational opportunity were explicit policies of the state throughout the country (Anderson, 2001, 35).”

**What the market approach** to educational reform **offers to Whites and the power structures driving these reforms is the belief that the concept of institutional racism have no merit. It legitimates the idea that America has achieve a “level playing field” and as such privileges** in education and economic opportunities **that Whites enjoy are due to individual “determination, a strong work ethic, high moral values, and a sound investment in education** (Giroux, 2004).” **This ideological standpoint leaves Whites and the elite free and clear, absolving them from feeling any sense of responsibility** to rebuild the physical infrastructure of American schools. This task proves critical for sustaining a high-quality learning environment for those students who have been cheated from such opportunities. **This leaves millions** of students in need of decent facilities and educational opportunities, especially **in urban areas**, and **in a strange twist of fate, only themselves to blame for the conditions in which they exist** (Anderson, 2005, 133).”

n recommended by geographers (McKittrick 2006, Pulido 2000).